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the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is also acknowledged.R´ esum´ e: Nous ´ etudions un monde ` a deux r´ egions, chacune d’elles ´ etant habit´ ee par un nombre
donn´ e mais diﬀ´ erent de travailleurs immobiles. Un nombre donn´ e de ﬁrmes mobiles choisissent
d’op´ erer dans l’une ou l’autre r´ egion. Les ﬁrmes cr´ eent des emplois l` a o` u elles se localisent mais
un certain niveau de chˆ omage frictionnel persiste malgr´ e tout. Des eﬀets d’agglom´ eration de deux
types sont envisag´ es, soient les ´ economies d’´ echelle dans l’appariement des travailleurs aux ﬁrmes
et les externalit´ e de production d´ ecoulant de la pr´ esence d’autres ﬁrmes. Nous ´ etudions le cas o` u
les r´ egions font partie d’un ´ Etat unitaire dans lequel le gouvernement central d´ ecide des politiques
r´ egionales. Nous ´ etudions aussi le cas d’un ´ Etat f´ ed´ eral dans lequel les gouvernements r´ egionaux
sont responsables des politiques r´ egionales. Pour chacun des types d’´ Etat, nous caract´ erisons
l’allocation des ressources et nous identiﬁons les instruments de politique ´ economique n´ ecessaires
` a l’atteinte de l’optimum social.
Abstract: A two-region economy consists of a given but diﬀerent number of immobile workers in
each region, and a given number of mobile ﬁrms. Firms create jobs where they locate, but there is
frictional unemployment. Two sorts of agglomeration eﬀects arise: those from economies of scale
in matching, and those from production economies external to the ﬁrm. Regions may either be
part of a unitary state in which case all regional policies are decided by the central government,
or they may be part of a federal state in which case some policies are determined by the regional
governments. We characterize the resource allocations in both a unitary and a federal state, and
identify the set of instruments that are required to replicate the social optimum in each state.
Key Words: Agglomeration, Inter-Jurisdictional Competition, Unemployment
JEL Classiﬁcation: H2, H7, J6, R31. INTRODUCTION
Economic activity tends to cluster. In Canada, for example, a disproportionately large share of the
manufacturing sector is located in Ontario while in other provinces, in particular in the Maritime
provinces, this sector is disproportionately small. In the USA, the clustering of several industries in
very few locations is identiﬁed, documented, and explained in Krugman (1993). The most prevalent
explanation for the clustering, or agglomeration, of economic activity revolves around the existence
of increasing returns of some sort. Suppose, for example, that ﬁrms are more proﬁtable when they
are located near other ﬁrms. Then, a cluster of ﬁrms in some location makes it attractive for other
ﬁrms to locate there, thereby making the cluster more attractive and reinforcing the phenomenon.
This clustering of economic activity has important real world implications. If there are indi-
viduals who are not willing or simply unable to move out of a region in which there is a limited
amount of economic activity, then these individuals are likely to have fewer opportunities than
those located in regions where economic activity is ﬂourishing. This, of course, is problematic if
society has some aversion to inequality. In this case, a diﬃcult policy problem must be solved. One
possibility is for policy to encourage ﬁrms to locate in regions in which they have not clustered
in the past, so that economic activity and opportunities will be more equally spread out. Alter-
natively, policy can take the clusters as given and simply redistribute income from the citizens of
well-endowed regions to those of less-endowed regions. This paper attempts to identify which of
these policies should be used.
Speciﬁcally, this paper models the process of job creation explicitly and studies the optimal
allocation of ﬁrms between regions and the policies that have to be implemented to achieve it.
We also study the equilibrium allocation(s) of ﬁrms when the policies are decentralized to regional
governments which compete for ﬁrms, and the role of a central government in inducing the regions
to choose optimal policies. We assume a two-region federation with immobile workers in each
region, and a given number of perfectly mobile ﬁrms. Jobs in each region are created by ﬁrms
that locate there, but there is imperfect matching of workers to jobs which gives rise to frictional
unemployment.1 Adding more ﬁrms to a region not only brings more job oﬀers and employment
directly, but can also have two types of scale or agglomeration eﬀects. First, there may be economies
of scale in the matching technology—or matching agglomeration eﬀects—which implies that the
proportion of job oﬀers ﬁlled increases with the number of ﬁrms in the region. Second, there may
be production economies external to the ﬁrm—or production agglomeration eﬀects—which cause
output per ﬁrm to rise with the total number of ﬁrms in the region. Both sorts of agglomeration
give rise to ineﬃciencies that require corrective policy action. In the literature, these agglomeration
forces fall into the category of localization economies — the general phenomenon which causes the
production costs of ﬁrms in a particular industry to decrease when the total output of the industry
increases. Localization economies are perceived as being important and relevant for policy. In
his discussion of the empirical literature on agglomeration economies, O’Sullivan (1993, pp. 31–
32) reports estimates for the elasticity of output per worker with respect to industry output — a
measure of the size of localization economies — ranging between 0.02 and 0.11.2 Note that the
1 Unemployment may arise for other reasons. For example, Fuest and Huber (1999) examine the
implication of unemployment resulting from wage bargaining for ﬁscal competition and coordination.
2 Thus, depending on the industry, a 10 percent increase in industrial output increases the productivity
of a worker by 0.20 to 1.10 percent.
1particular agglomeration forces we focus on diﬀer from those generally studied in the economic
geography literature. The latter models usually focus on increasing returns internal to imperfectly
competitive ﬁrms, pecuniary externalities, and transportation costs (see Kind et al. (2000) and
Ludema and Wooton (2000)), which nevertheless also all fall into the category of localization
economies. In addition, full employment is usually assumed in the standard economic geography
literature.
To focus on the role of ﬁrms, we adopt a model with relatively few elements. Both ﬁrms and
workers are identical across regions. Workers are entirely passive: all participate in the labour
market, and are either employed or involuntarily unemployed. Firms choose where to locate and
how many job oﬀers to make. All agents are well-informed. Firms anticipate market outcomes,
knowing how many job oﬀers will be ﬁlled as well as market prices and government policies, and
take them as given. The government can observe who is involuntarily unemployed, and oﬀers full
unemployment insurance. It is, however, constrained by the matching process that determines the
number of job oﬀers that are ﬁlled. The government is also able to impose lump-sum taxes and
transfers on ﬁrms and workers, and does so to pursue a Pareto optimum involving the welfare of
workers in each region and the owners of ﬁrms. The only diﬀerence between the two regions is the
number of immobile workers, although we treat as a special case that in which the regions are the
same size.
To characterize the social optimum, we allow a central planner to choose all of the relevant
variables such as consumption, employment, vacancies, the amount of involuntary unemployment,
and the location of ﬁrms. We then examine the resulting allocations under the special cases of no
agglomeration, production agglomeration, and matching agglomeration. With no agglomeration,
the optimal allocation is symmetric in the sense that per worker variables are identical in both
regions whether or not they are the same size. With matching or production agglomeration, the
optimal allocation may be symmetric if the two regions are the same size, but necessarily asym-
metric if they are not. If the matching function has increasing returns to scale, but diminishing
marginal products, there will be a unique local and global optimum. In this case of matching
agglomeration, if regions have the same population, this optimum will again be symmetric. How-
ever, if the regions diﬀer in size, the larger region will also have a higher proportion of ﬁrms per
worker. With production agglomeration, things are much more complicated. There will generally
be multiple local optima, even in the case of same-sized regions. In the global optimum, either
region can have the higher ratio of ﬁrms to workers.
The policies that are needed to internalize the externalities of agglomeration are straightfor-
ward to specify. The matching technology gives rise to hiring externalities whether or not agglom-
eration eﬀects are present. These can be corrected by an employment subsidy or tax. Production
agglomeration eﬀects, which induce a non-optimal allocation of ﬁrms across regions, require dif-
ferential ﬁrm taxation. In a decentralized federation, regional governments will in fact choose the
correct employment subsidy. However, they will not choose the correct ﬁrm tax. This is because,
although their choice of tax on ﬁrms will properly take account of the production externality, it will
include an element of ineﬃcient tax competition. We show how a central government can intervene
with its own ﬁrm tax to ensure that the optimal allocation of ﬁrms across regions is achieved.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we study the behaviour
of the private sector, given government policies. In Section 3, we characterize the socially optimal
allocation of resources and then determine, in Section 4, the set of unitary state government tax
2and transfer policies that are necessary to replicate the social optimum in a market economy. In
Section 5, the replication of the social optimum in a market economy is again examined, but in
the context of a federal state. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude and oﬀer a brief discussion about
possible extensions.
2. PRIVATE SECTOR BEHAVIOUR
There are two regions indexed by i =1 ,2. Regions may be part of a unitary state in which case
regional policies are decided at the central government level as examined in Section IV, or they
may be part of a federal state in which case some regional policies are determined at the regional
level, and others at the central level as examined in Section V. The private sector in each region is
composed of both workers and ﬁrms. When dealing with a representative region, we suppress the
regional subscript. We also adopt the convention of using uppercase letters to refer to region-wide
variables and lowercase letters to individual ﬁrm or worker variables.
Region i has Li immobile workers, with L1 ≥ L2. All workers supply one unit of labour and
have identical utility functions u(c) with u0 > 0 >u 00, where c is a composite consumption good
whose price is normalized to unity. Utility is the same whether individuals are working or not.3
Our analysis focuses on the behaviour of ﬁrms and so, to simplify, we assume workers are passive.
In all equilibria characterized below, they will remain attached to the labour market — employed
or involuntarily unemployed.
Firms make two types of decisions. First, they choose the region in which to operate. Second,
they post vacancies, succeed at ﬁlling some of them, and then produce and earn proﬁts. The pro-
portion of vacancies ﬁlled, and therefore the unemployment rate in each region, will be determined
by a simple matching technology described below. When making their decisions, ﬁrms take as
given government policies, which include both employment and ﬁrm taxes. In a market economy,
the sequence of events is therefore as follows:
Stage 1: Choice of policies by government(s);
Stage 2: Location decision by ﬁrms;
Stage 3: Hiring decision by ﬁrms, and determination of employment and output.
The rest of this section describes ﬁrm decision-making at Stages 2 and 3 for a representative
region, and solves for the resulting regional labour market equilibrium. The governments’ policy
choices in Stage 1 are examined in Sections 4 and 5. The relevant equilibrium concept for the
various games studied is that of subgame perfection. Thus, we begin by ﬁrst solving for Stage 3
and then for Stage 2.
2.1. Stage 3: Regional Labour Market Equilibrium
At this stage, the number of ﬁrms in the representative region has been determined. We begin by
looking at how individual ﬁrms behave, and then turn to equilibrium in the regional labour market
as a whole.
3 Incorporating some disutility of work (or utility of leisure) would only complicate the analysis and
not aﬀect the basic results.
3Firm Equilibrium
There are N identical ﬁrms which are costlessly mobile between the two regions, so N = N1 +
N2. In the representative region, each ﬁrm produces output according to the production function
a(N)f(e), where e is per ﬁrm employment, a(N) ≥ 0, a0 ≥ 0, f0 > 0 >f 00 and f(0) = 0. If a0 > 0,
there is said to be production agglomeration: the more ﬁrms there are in a given region, the higher
output per ﬁrm will be in that region for a given level of employment.4 If there is no production
agglomeration, then a0 = 0. In this case, we assume for simplicity that a(N)=1 .
Frictional unemployment arises in this economy as a result of the imperfectmatching of workers
to jobs.5 In order to hire workers, each ﬁrm posts v vacancies. Labour markets are regional in
nature. The total number of unemployed workers who are matched to posted vacancies in a region,
denoted by M, depends on the number of involuntary unemployed I and the total number of job
vacancies V = Nv in the region. The number of matches is determined by a matching technology
M(I,V), which is assumed to satisfy MI,M V > 0 and MII,M VV < 0. This matching function
is taken to be homogeneous of degree ρ ≥ 1i n( I,V). If ρ>1, there is matching agglomeration.
Increasing I and V by the same factor increases the number of matches in the region by that
factor to the power ρ. Given the homogeneity of M(I,V), it is useful to rewrite it in the intensive
form. Deﬁne s ≡ I/V. This ratio represents the slackness in the labour market from a potential








It is straightforwardto show that, given our assumptions about the function M(I,V), m0 > 0 >m 00,
sm0(s)/m(s) ≡ η ∈ (0,1), and ρ−η<1.6 Note for future referencethat the total number of matches
is M(I,V)=V ρm(s), and the proportion of vacancies ﬁlled is M/V = V ρ−1m(s). To simplify our
analysis in what follows, we assume that η is a constant. This will be the case if M(I,V) is of the
Cobb-Douglas form.
The proportion of a given ﬁrm’s vacancies v that are ﬁlled depends both on the average
proportion of vacancies ﬁlled region-wide, M/V, as well as on the wage the ﬁrm oﬀers to pay. The
higher the ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer relative to other ﬁrms in the economy, the more likely its vacancies
will be ﬁlled. If the number of job matches at the ﬁrm level were independent of wages, then ﬁrms
would have no incentive to oﬀer positive wages.7 Let r be the ﬁrm’s relative wage, so its wage
4 The assumption that production agglomeration depends on the number of ﬁrms rather than, say,
total employment or output is not innocuous, as we shall see later. Our presumption is that each ﬁrm
is associated with an entrepreneur or management team whose ideas or production methods might
spill over to other ﬁrms independent of the number of workers it employs. Agglomeration associated
with total employment is captured by our matching externality discussed below.
5 We assume that there is imperfect matching even though the heterogeneity of ﬁrms and workers is
not explicitly modeled. This simplifying assumption is standard in the search/matching literature
(e.g. see Diamond, 1982).
6 Diﬀerentiating M(I,V)=V ρm(s), we obtain: MI = V ρ−1m0(s) > 0, MV = V ρ−1m(s)(ρ − η) > 0,
MII = V ρ−2m00(s) < 0, and MVV = V ρ−2[ρ − η − 1]m(s)(ρ − η) < 0, which implies the stated
properties.
7 This is no longer the case if ﬁrms bargain with workers to determine a ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage once a
4oﬀer is rw where w is the market wage. For simplicity, we assume that the proportion of ﬁrm
vacancies ﬁlled takes the simple multiplicative form, rM/V. In each ‘period’, a proportion b of
those employed at any given ﬁrm will exogenously separate from their job.8 In the steady-state,
each ﬁrm’s new hires will equal its separations, so (rM/V)v = be. This equality will be referred to
as the ﬁrm matching constraint.9 It is also assumed that there is a ﬁxed cost per retained worker
(1 − b)e and per vacancy created v (equivalently, the number of employees e plus the number of
vacancies created but not ﬁlled, v − be), assumed for simplicity to be ψ for both.10
Below, we assume that governments use two policy instruments that aﬀect ﬁrms: an em-
ployment tax σ for each worker the ﬁrm employs, and a lump-sum tax per ﬁrm T. It will be
shown that these policy instruments are suﬃcient for achieving eﬃcient production outcomes in a
federal state. When making their choices, ﬁrms take these policies as given. They also treat the
region-wide variables I and V as ﬁxed, that is, they take the ratio of these two variables s and
the proportion of vacancies ﬁlled M/V = V ρ−1m(s) as given. Firms also take as given the wage




π − T = a(N)f(e)− (rw + σ)e − ψ
￿





where we have substituted out v using the ﬁrm’s matching constraint.
In equilibrium, all ﬁrms will behave identically so r = 1. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the





a(N)f0(e) − (w + σ) − ψ
￿





match has been formed. Such an alternative wage determination process is standard in the matching
literature (for example, see Pissarides, 2000).
8 Allowing for the number of ﬁrm vacancies ﬁlled to depend directly on the ﬁrm’s actual wage would
not change any of our qualitative results. Allowing the separation rate b to be endogenous would
complicate the model considerably.
9 The matching model used here is a simpliﬁed version of that found in Layard and Johnson (1986).
Our model is in fact the steady-state version of a fully dynamic model presented in the Appendix.
As shown there, the ﬁrm’s matching constraint used here corresponds to the transition equation in
the fully dynamic problem. When evaluated in the steady state, the Euler equations of the problem
in the Appendix correspond to the ﬁrst-order conditions below. In this paper, we are interested in
steady-state outcomes and how government policies aﬀect them.
10 The ﬁxed cost of posting and maintaining vacancies reﬂects advertising costs, human resources staﬀ
and other associated search costs. The ﬁxed cost per retained worker reﬂects the operating costs of
the ﬁrm such as maintaining oﬃce spaces and providing oﬃce supplies. Assuming the latter ﬁxed
cost to be zero would not aﬀect our results. We include it here to reﬂect a commitment of the ﬁrm
to ﬁlling its posted vacanices. However, assuming a positive cost of creating vacanices is necessary
for our story of equilibrium unemployment. Therefore, we can think of the ﬁxed cost, ψ, as reﬂecting
matching frictions in the labour market.
11 The second-order conditions are satisﬁed.
5The condition (r) determines the market wage rate that all ﬁrms are satisﬁed with (i.e., such that









which yields e(N,σ,V,s), where eN ≥ 0, eσ < 0, eV ≥ 0, and es > 0.12 Firm proﬁts can then be
written as:






where πN ≥ 0, πσ < 0, πV ≥ 0, and πs > 0.13 For later reference, it is useful to rewrite the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts in a more conventional form by substituting in its ﬁrst-order conditions (2) to give:
π(N,σ,V,s)=a(N)f(e(·))− e(·)a(N)f0(e(·)) (3)
Regional Labour Market Equilibrium
Equilibrium in a representative region requires that those in the regional labour force are either
employed or involuntarily unemployed and that the aggregate matching constraint be satisﬁed.
Thus, the following two conditions must be satisﬁed:14
L = Ne(N,σ,V,s)+sV ; bNe(N,σ,V,s)=V ρm(s) (4)
These can be solved for V (N,σ) and s(N,σ). Total diﬀerentiation of the equations in (4) yields:
VN =















where, by our assumption that ρ − η<1,




m0(s)+bV 1−ρ(1 − ρ + η)
￿
> 0
which implies that the labour market equilibrium is stable.
Using these, we obtain equilibrium wages, employment and proﬁts:
w(V (N,σ),s(N,σ)),e (N,σ,V(N,σ),s(N,σ)),π (N,σ,V(N,σ),s(N,σ))
12 Diﬀerentiating (2), we obtain eN = −a0(N)f0(e)/[a(N)f00(e)] ≥ 0, eσ =1 /[a(N)f00(e)] < 0, eV =
2wV /[a(N)f00(e)] ≥ 0, and es =2 ws/[a(N)f00(e)] > 0.
13 By the Envelope Theorem, we have πN = a0(N)f(e) ≥ 0, πσ = −e<0, πV = −2ewV ≥ 0, and
πs = −2ews > 0.
14 Recall, L is the size of the regional labour force. Therefore, the ﬁrst condition states that L = Ne+I




= wV VN + wssN > 0;
dw
dσ
= wV Vσ + wssσ < 0
de
dN
= eN + eV VN + essN;
de
dσ
= eσ + eV Vσ + essσ < 0 (5)
dπ
dN
= πN + πV VN + πssN;
dπ
dσ
= πσ + πV Vσ + πssσ < 0
The signs of dπ/dN and de/dN are ambiguous when there are production agglomeration eﬀects. If
there are none (a0 = 0), these expressions are necessarily negative. In other words, increasing the
number of ﬁrms in a region reduces per ﬁrm employment and proﬁts unless there are suﬃciently
large production externalities.
2.2. Stage 2: Location Equilibrium
Since ﬁrms are choosing where to locate, it is necessary to distinguish between the two regions in
what follows. Given regional policies (σ1,σ 2,T 1,T 2), ﬁrms fully anticipate the after-tax proﬁts that
they can earn in each region. In equilibrium, after-tax proﬁts must be equalized in both regions:
π1(N1,σ 1,V 1(N1,σ 1),s 1(N1,σ 1)) − T1 = π2(N2,σ 2,V 2(N2,σ 2),s 2(N2,σ 2)) − T2 (6)
where N2 = N −N1. This equation determines N1 as a function of regional policies (σ1,σ 2,T 1,T 2).
For stability of the location equilibrium, the diﬀerence in per ﬁrm proﬁts between region 1 and 2
must be decreasing in the number of ﬁrms locating in region 1, so dπ1/dN1 + dπ2/dN2 < 0. As
mentioned, in the absence of production agglomeration, dπ/dN < 0, and the stability condition is
met. However, it is possible that dπ/dN becomes positive when there is production agglomeration.
In what follows, we assume that the location equilibrium is stable.
This completes our analysis of private sector behaviour. What remains to be considered is
Stage 1 of the sequence of events. We return to that in Sections 4 and 5 for the cases of a unitary
state and a federation. First, we present the social optimum benchmark against which the outcomes
of Section 4 and 5 will be compared.
3. THE SOCIAL OPTIMUM
To be as general as possible, we characterize the social optimum in this economy by assuming
there exists a central planner who solves the Pareto problem of maximizing the per capita utility
of workers in one region subject to some minimum level of per capita utility U in the other region.
This implies that only workers count. In the next section, we allow for the fact that there may be a
group of non-workers who own ﬁrms, in which case a minimum proﬁt constraint has to be added to
the problem to account for their utility. For now, all output will be assumed to accrue to workers.
All workers face some risk of unemployment. Since they are risk-averse and the governments can
observe who is involuntarily unemployed, we assume from the start that there is full unemployment
insurance, so individuals receive the same level of consumption whether or not they are working.
Restricting the ability of governments to identify the involuntarily unemployed would imply that
only second-best policies with less than full unemployment insurance could be used. This would
complicate the problem without adding any new insight.15
15 Optimal policies under imperfect information in the labour market are analyzed in Boadway, Cuﬀ
and Marceau (2003).
7The planner can choose the location of ﬁrms, as well as ﬁrm employment, ﬁrm vacancies, the
ratio of regional involuntary unemployment to regional vacancies, and individual consumption in
each region. However, it is constrained by the imperfect matching between workers and jobs in
each region, and by the ﬁxed number of ﬁrms in the economy as a whole. The planner’s problem




subject to a minimum level of per capita utility in region 2,
u(c2) ≥ U (ϕ)
the resource constraint,
N1[a(N1)f(e1)−ψ((1−b)e1+v1)]+(N −N1)[a(N −N1)f(e2)−ψ((1−b)e2+v2)]−L1c1−L2c2 =0
(λ)
the labour market equilibrium conditions,
L1 − N1e1 − s1N1v1 =0 ( δ1)
L2 − (N − N1)e2 − s2(N − N1)v2 =0 ( δ2)
and the regional matching constraints,
(N1v1)ρm(s1) − bN1e1 =0 ( γ1)
((N − N1)v2)ρm(s2) − b(N − N1)e2 =0 ( γ2)
where the constraints are labeled by the Lagrange multipliers used in the constrained maximization
problem.
The social optimum is the solution to the following ﬁve conditions obtained from the ﬁrst-order
conditions and the matching constraints (γ1) and (γ2) after routine substitution, where s has been
substituted out using the labour market equilibrium condition, s =( L/N − e)/v:16
Firm Allocation by Region:
a(N1)f(e1)−e1a(N1)f0(e1)+N1a0(N1)f(e1) = (7)




1 − b +
m0((Li/Ni − ei)/vi)+b(Nivi)
1−ρ
m((Li/Ni − ei)/vi)(ρ − η)
#
i =1 ,2 (8)
16 A technical appendix available on request from the authors presents the details of the derivations of
the results in this section.
8Matching Constraints:
bNiei =( Nivi)
ρ m((Li/Ni − ei)/vi) i =1 ,2 (9)
These ﬁve equations determine the socially optimal values of {e1,e 2,v 1,v 2,N 1}. Their values
will depend critically on what type of agglomeration there is, if any, in the economy. With the
existence of agglomeration eﬀects of either sort, the size of the region enters explicitly into the
condition determining optimal ﬁrm employment, while with production agglomeration alone size
enters explicitly into the condition determining the optimal ﬁrm allocation.
Note that none of the ﬁve equations depends on the relative utility levels in the two regions,
that is, on the point achieved on the national utility possibilities frontier (UPF). In eﬀect, the
solution to the above problem maximizes the total product in the economy. The amount of re-
sources available for total consumption, L1c1 + L2c2, is determined from the resource constraint
(λ) evaluated at the above solution. How these resources are distributed between workers in the
economy will depend on the value of U, that is, which point on the economy-wide UPF the planner
wants to achieve. For example, under a utilitarian objective, the planner would want to equalize
the marginal utility of consumption of all individuals which, given our assumption on the util-
ity function, translates into equal per capita consumption, c1 = c2 = c, where c would be the
maximized total product in the economy divided by total population L1 + L2.
Using (7)–(9), we next characterize the possible outcomes in the social optimum by considering
the following three special cases: no agglomeration, matching agglomeration only, and production
agglomeration only.
3.1. Characterization of the Social Optimum
Recall that L1 ≥ L2, so regions may be the same size, with L1 = L2, or they may diﬀer in size, in
which case Region 1 is assumed to be the larger one, so L1 >L 2. Whether regions diﬀer in size
aﬀects the nature of the social optimum when there are agglomeration eﬀects.
Case 1: No Agglomeration
With no agglomeration, a =1a n dρ = 1. In this case, the optimal allocation is symmetric in terms
of per capita variables. Thus, the ratio of regional population to number of ﬁrms is equalized across
regions (L1/N1 = L2/N2), and all per ﬁrm and per worker variables are identical in both regions
(e1 = e2, v1 = v2). If regions have the same population, then the outcome is fully symmetric
since there are equal number of ﬁrms in both regions. The second-order conditions of the social
optimum are satisﬁed everywhere when there are no agglomeration eﬀects. Therefore, the solution
to the above conditions (7)–(9) is unique.
Case 2: Matching Agglomeration
With only matching agglomeration, a = 1 and ρ>1. In this case, if regions are the same size
(L1 = L2) the ratio of regional population to number of ﬁrms will be the same (L1/N1 = L2/N2).
But if L1 >L 2, then optimality requires that L1/N1 <L 2/N2: disproportionately more ﬁrms
should be allocated to the larger region to exploit the matching agglomeration eﬀect. As in the
no-agglomeration case, the second-order conditions are satisﬁed everywhere, so the solution to
(7)–(9) is again unique. With same-sized regions, the fully symmetric outcome again satisﬁes all
the necessary conditions and therefore it is the unique optimum.
9Case 3: Production Agglomeration
When there is only production agglomeration, a0 > 0 and ρ = 1. In this case, the second-order
conditions are not necessarily satisﬁed, so there can be multiple local optima with suﬃciently large
agglomeration eﬀects. If the regions are the same size, then the equilibrium can be the symmetric
one with L1/N1 = L2/N2. But, even if regions are the same size and the second-order conditions
are not satisﬁed everywhere, then the social optimum might involve L1/N1> <L2/N2. If one region
is larger, then the equilibrium must be asymmetric: L1/N1 6= L2/N2. Therefore, with regions
that diﬀer in size, there are two possible types of equilibria: L1/N1 <L 2/N2 and L1/N1 >L 2/N2
with N1 6= N2. Unlike with matching agglomeration, it may be optimal to put disproportionately
more ﬁrms in the smaller region in the presence of production agglomeration. If the production
agglomeration is particularly strong, then the social optimum may be characterized by all ﬁrms
being concentrated in a single region.
4. THE UNITARY STATE
Decentralizing the social optimum to a market economy setting turns out to be relatively straight-
forward, as long as we retain the assumption of a unitary state, i.e. a single level of government.
Going back to the sequence of events described in Section 2, a unitary state government is assumed
to decide on all regional policies in Stage 1. Then, ﬁrms choose where to locate in Stage 2, and
how many workers to hire and the number of vacancies to create in Stage 3. The instruments
needed by the unitary state government to decentralize the social optimum are regional-speciﬁc
taxes/transfers on employment, ﬁrms, and households.
We ﬁrst examine ﬁrm hiring (Stage 3), and characterize the employment tax needed to inter-
nalize the externalities arising from imperfect matching. Then, turning to ﬁrm location in Stage
2, we determine the necessary taxes on ﬁrms required to ensure the eﬃcient distribution of ﬁrms
between regions. We then discuss how these taxes together with lump-sum taxes on working house-
holds and transfers to the unemployed can ensure that the desired point on the socially optimal
UPF is achieved. The allocation of resources achieved by this three-stage procedure is the result
of a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
4.1. Employment Taxes
Recall that the marginal productivity condition determining the choice of e in the representative
region in the social optimum is given by (8), while that determining the choice of e by competitive
ﬁrms is given by (2). To ensure that the choice of e by ﬁrms corresponds to the socially optimal
e, the employment tax must be set such that the right-hand side of (2) is equal to the right-hand










Note that this rule for the employment tax σ is not aﬀected by a(N), but does depend on matching
frictions in the labour market. In other words, σ corrects for an externality arising from the
matching process (including matching agglomeration eﬀects through ρ), but not the production
agglomeration externality.17
17 The tax/subsidy σ would also depend on production agglomeration if the latter were a function of
10To gain further insight into nature of the optimal employment tax, we can characterize ex-
plicitly the matching externality. It arises in this economy because each ﬁrm j of the N ﬁrms
in a representative region ignores the full eﬀects its choice of employment ej (or equivalently, job
vacancies vj) has on total output in that region. To see this, note that total output in a region













where we have used the ﬁrm matching constraint with rk = 1 in equilibrium. The economy-wide
variables V and s depend on the employment decisions of all ﬁrms in the economy. In particular, the
regional labour market equilibrium conditions (4) can be written as L = E+sV and bE = V ρm(s),
where aggregate employment E is given by E =
PN
k=1 ek. These conditions determine V and s as




bV + V ρm0(s)





−ρV ρ−1m(s) − bs
V ρm(s)(ρ − η)
< 0
Consider now the eﬀect of an increase in ﬁrm j’s employment on total output Y . Noting that
∂E/∂ej = 1, diﬀerentiating the above expression for Y with respect to ej and evaluating it at a
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where we have added and subtracted the equilibrium wage rate, w. The two terms in braces reﬂect
the eﬀect of an increase in employment perceived by the ﬁrm and the external eﬀect imposed on
the rest of the regional economy. From the ﬁrm’s optimization problem, the ﬁrst term is equal
to zero. The externality term has the following interpretation. The wage rate w appears because
the ﬁrm in its choice of employment treats the wage rate as a cost to itself along with the ﬁxed
costs of employment ψ. However, only the latter is a true social cost. Involuntarily unemployed
workers have no opportunity cost. Therefore, hiring one more worker from the pool of involuntarily
unemployed does not involve any social cost other than the additional resources needed to pay for
the increase in the ﬁxed costs arising from hiring that additional worker. The last two components
of the externality term reﬂect the additional hiring costs that are imposed on other ﬁrms when
one ﬁrm increases its employment: a change in ej will increase total employment E, which will
aﬀect the economy-wide variables V and s, in turn tightening all other ﬁrms’ matching constraints.
This is apparent when substituting the ﬁrm matching constraint, v = beV (E)1−ρ/m(s(E)), in the







total regional employment rather than the total number of ﬁrms in the region, i.e. if production
were given by a(Ne)f(e) with a0(Ne) ≥ 0. In this case, the production agglomeration eﬀect term
(Na0(Ne)f(e)) in the social optimum would appear in the condition determining the optimal ﬁrm
employment rather than the optimal ﬁrm location.
11where dv/dE > 0.18 To maintain a given level of employment, ﬁrms must post more vacancies
when total employment goes up.
More relevant for our purpose is the fact that the externality term in (11) reduces to the
negative of the right-hand side of (10) when the expressions for w =( ψbV 1−ρ)/m(s), ∂s/∂E and
∂V/∂E are substituted into (11). Thus, setting σ as in equation (10) corrects for the externali-
ties arising from imperfect matching in the labour market. The sign of this externality eﬀect is
indeterminate: either an employment subsidy or an employment tax will generally be needed to
decentralize the social optimum to a unitary state setting.
For an indication of the sign and magnitude of this externality, we can re-write the externality
component of (11) as follows by using the expression for the optimal choice of the ﬁrm’s wage given



















The sign of this expression is positive if the elasticity of per ﬁrm vacancies with respect to total
employment is less than one, and negative if the elasticity is greater than one. In the former case,
per ﬁrm employment is too low from a social point of view and an employment subsidy is required to
achieve the social optimum. In the latter case, per ﬁrm employment is too high and an employment
tax is necessary to achieve the social optimum. In terms of the fundamental parameters of this
economy, using (11), it can be shown that in the case of no matching agglomeration (ρ = 1), the
externality is negative if the following condition holds:
b(1 − 2η) <m 0(s)
A suﬃcient condition for the above to be satisﬁed is if η ≥ 1/2. Therefore, if the matching function
is suﬃciently elastic then the government should be taxing employment. A necessary condition for
an employment subsidy is that η<1/2 and the suﬃcient condition is given by b(1 − 2η) >m 0(s).
4.2. Taxes on Firms and Households
In order to fully decentralize the social optimum, the allocation of ﬁrms between regions must also
be eﬃcient. Ensuring that the socially optimal decision rule for e is used is not enough to do this.
In particular, condition (7) determining the optimal distribution of ﬁrms must also be satisﬁed. To
ensure this, the equilibrium ﬁrm location condition (6) must give rise to the eﬃcient distribution
of ﬁrms. Let T1 and T2 be regional-speciﬁc taxes on ﬁrms. These taxes potentially play two roles.
First, they provide an incentive for ﬁrms to locate eﬃciently and second, they divert proﬁts from
ﬁrms to households in the event that ﬁrms are not owned by the households that make up the
working population. Consider these two roles in turn.
First, ﬁrms locate such that net proﬁts are equalized or, in other words until the location
equilibrium condition, π1 −T1 = π2 − T2, is satisﬁed. Using the expression (3) for ﬁrm proﬁts, we
can rewrite this equilibrium condition as:
a(N1)f(e1) − e1a(N1)f0(e1) − T1 = a(N2)f(e2) − e2a(N2)f0(e2) − T2 (13)
18 Using the ﬁrm’s matching constraint, we have dv/dE =( ∂v/∂V)(∂V/∂E)+( ∂v/∂s)(∂s/∂E)=
be[bV 1−ρ(1 − ρ + η)+m0(s)]/[m(s)2V ρ(ρ − η)] > 0.
12Condition (13) will correspond to the optimal ﬁrm allocation rule (6) provided the following rela-
tionship between T1 and T2 holds:
T2 − T1 = N1a0(N1)f(e1) − N2a0(N2)f(e2) (14)
This condition ensures the eﬃcient distribution of ﬁrms. It is worth noting that if there were no
production agglomeration, then a0 = 0 and the tax on ﬁrms is not needed to correct for an ineﬃcient
distribution of ﬁrms. In this case, T1 = T2 and proﬁts before tax give the correct signal of the
value of the ﬁrm to the region, so an eﬃcient distribution of ﬁrms will result without intervention
even if matching agglomeration existed.
The above instruments ensure that the total product in the economy is maximized. The next
issue is how to ensure the optimal distribution of this product between workers in the two regions.
As in the previous section, we assume that the government has enough information to provide full
insurance. At the same time, the level of per capita consumption can diﬀer across regions. By
varying the latter, the unitary state government can choose the most preferred point on the nation-
wide UPF. If the ﬁrms are owned by households in the two regions, all wages and after-tax proﬁts
will accrue to them. It is then suﬃcient for the government to impose lump-sum region-speciﬁc
taxes and transfers on households to allocate total output optimally among households. In this
case the absolute level of the taxes on ﬁrms Ti is not important, only their relative values across
regions matters. On the other hand, if ﬁrms are owned by non-workers who receive no welfare
weight, then the unitary government simply sets the taxes on ﬁrms so that the net return to a ﬁrm
is at its minimum level which is assumed to be zero. Either way, the unitary state government is
able to distribute the total resources produced in the economy to households.
We now turn to the decentralization of government policies to a federal setting. We show how
allowing regional governments to choose regional policies will result in an ineﬃcient outcome in
the absence of a central government. Regional governments acting as Nash competitors will distort
their policies to attract ﬁrms to their regions. As a result, national product will not be maximized.
Corrective central government policies will be required to achieve the social optimum.
5. THE FEDERAL STATE
We focus ﬁrst on the case where all regional ﬁscal decisions are taken by regional governments.
Later we consider how a central government might intervene to ensure that the social optimum
is attained. We consider the general case in which there can be both types of agglomeration
and assume that the regional government policies include an employment tax σ, a tax per ﬁrm
of t (rather than T as in the unitary state case above), and lump-sum taxes and transfers on
households. Regional governments maximize the per capita utility of households in their region,
which is equivalent to maximizing the sum of utilities since households are immobile. We assume
initially that ﬁrms are owned by the working population in each region, and that households in
region i own an equal per capita share of b Ni ﬁrms where b N1 + b N2 = N. Regional governments are
ﬁrst-movers and set their policies in Stage 1. Once regional policies are set, ﬁrms decide in which
region to locate in Stage 2, and then the regional labour market comes to an equilibrium in Stage
3. Again, the equilibrium is an SPNE. Having solved Stages 2 and 3 in Section 2, we immediately
turn to the setting of regional policies in Stage 1.
135.1. Stage 1: Regional Government Policies
Regions anticipate the eﬀect of their policies both on the location equilibrium and on their own
labour markets, and take as given the policy choices of the other region. Since the government can
impose lump-sum taxes on households, choosing those taxes is equivalent to choosing per capita
consumption. For analytical convenience, we treat c as the choice variable of the representative
regional government (which we take to be region 1). The problem of this government can be




subject to its resource constraint,
[w(V (N,σ),s(N,σ)) + σ]Ne(N,σ,V(N,σ),s(N,σ))
+ Nt+ b N[π(N,σ,V(N,σ),s(N,σ)) − t] − Lc =0 ( λ)
and the location equilibrium condition,
π(N,σ,V(N,σ),s(N,σ)) − t
− π2(N − N,σ2,V 2(N − N,σ2),s 2(N − N,σ2)) + t2 =0 ( µ)
where again the constraints are labeled by the Lagrange multipliers used in the constrained max-
imization problem. Notice that we are treating the number of ﬁrms N as an artiﬁcial control
variable, while adding the location equilibrium condition as a constraint. We could equivalently
have simply taken the number of ﬁrms to be determined endogenously by the solution to the loca-
tion equilibrium constraint N(σ,σ2,t,t 2). As well, we are implicitly assuming that a non-negative
after-tax proﬁt constraint on ﬁrm proﬁts is not binding.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
u0(c) − λL =0 ( c)






































Substituting (t) along with the relevant expressions in (5) for dw/dσ, de/dσ and dπ/dσ into (σ)
and simplifying, we can solve for σ. This yields (10), the same expression as in the unitary state
case. As shown before, this level of employment tax will ensure that the regional ﬁrms are following
the eﬃcient decision rule for e. In other words, regions will choose their employment tax policies
so that the matching externality is correctly taken into account. However, since the allocation of
ﬁrms may diﬀer between the SPNE and the social optimum, this alone does not ensure that ﬁrm
employment will be socially optimal.
Next, consider the regional government’s choice of the tax on ﬁrms. We can derive an expres-
sion for t by substituting (t) into (N):19






+( w + σ)e − N
dπ
dN
+( N − b N)
dπ2
dN
19 The details of this analysis are available on request in the Technical Appendix.
14Then, substituting in for w, σ, dπ/dN, de/dN, and dw/dN from (5), and simplifying:




An analogous expression is obtained for region 2. Recall from (14) above that to ensure a socially
optimal allocation in the unitary state, regional ﬁrm taxes should be set such that t2 − t1 =
N1a0(N1)f(e1) − N2a0(N2)f(e2). Thus, since the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (15) is
not expected to be zero, regional governments generally set their taxes on ﬁrms non-optimally.
Although the regions take proper account of the production agglomeration eﬀect (the second term
in (15), they use t to attract ﬁrms to their regions.20 Given that dπ2/dN2 < 0 by the stability
of the location equilibrium, the sign of the tax competition eﬀect depends on the number of ﬁrms
locating in the region relative to the number of ﬁrms owned by individuals in that region.
If, as we have assumed above, the ﬁrms are owned by the L members of the workforce, all
proﬁts will end up being consumed by them in the two regions. The allocation of resources will
diﬀer from the social optimum analyzed above for two reasons. First, national output will not be
maximized because ﬁrms locate ineﬃciently between the two regions. Second, the relative levels
of consumption between households in the two regions will diﬀer from the social optimum since
there is no mechanism to redistribute consumption between regions. If ﬁrms are not owned by
households, but by owners who do not count in regional social welfare functions, then there will
be a third problem. Indeed, to the extent that the tax on ﬁrms is competed down, there will be
positive after-tax proﬁts that are not available for consumption.
To gain further insight into the consequences of tax competition, it is useful to characterize the
SPNE in the special case of no agglomeration. Recall that without agglomeration (a0 =0 ,ρ= 1),
the social optimum is symmetric in per ﬁrm terms, which implies that ﬁrm employment and proﬁts
are the same in both regions and L1/N1 = L2/N2. There is no need for diﬀerential ﬁrm tax rates
between regions. Consider ﬁrst the case in which ﬁrms are owned by members of the workforce.
Then, by (15), regions choose tax rates according to the following tax rules in the SPNE:
t1 =(b N1 − N1)
dπ2
dN2
t2 =( N1 − b N1)
dπ1
dN1
where we have used the fact that b N1+ b N2 = N = N1+N2. Clearly, the region which is a net gainer
of ﬁrms will want to tax them, and the net loser will want to subsidize them. This is analogous
to the standard terms-of-trade eﬀect in the capital tax competition literature. Whether the social
optimum can be supported as an SPNE depends on the diﬀerence between the distribution of ﬁrm
ownership b Ni and the location of ﬁrms within each region in the eﬃcient allocation, say, No
i .I f
it is the case that b Ni = No
i for i =1 ,2, then both regions will set their tax rates to zero and
the SPNE will be eﬃcient. For example, suppose as assumed in Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson
(1991) that individuals in both regions own an equal share of all the ﬁrms in the economy, so
b Ni = LiN/(L1+L2). Since in the social optimum L1/N1 = L2/N2 =( L1+L2)/N for L1 ≥ L2 we
20 Note regions do not use employment taxes or subsidies to compete for ﬁrms: σ is chosen so as to
internalize the matching externality. If regions were for some reason precluded from using a tax on
ﬁrms, say because it was assigned to the central government, then regions would be induced to choose
non-optimal employment policies (see Boadway, Cuﬀ, and Marceau, 2002).
15have b Ni = No
i . The eﬃcient allocation of ﬁrms can be supported as a SPNE.21 On the other hand,
if b Ni 6= No
i , then starting from the social optimum allocation of ﬁrms, regions will have an incentive
to set diﬀerential ﬁrm taxes and the SPNE will be ineﬃcient. Depending on the distribution of
ﬁrm ownership, one region will tax ﬁrms and the other will subsidize. Or, if ﬁrms are owned by
non-workers whose utility does not count, then both regions will tax ﬁrms.22
The upshot is that in the absence of agglomeration eﬀects, ﬁrm allocation can be eﬃcient in the
SPNE provided households in a given region own the same number of ﬁrms as are located in that
region in the social optimum. This continues to be true in the presence of matching externalities.23
Allowing instead for a production externality gives both regions an incentive to subsidize ﬁrms
regardless of the distribution of ﬁrm ownership, and therefore will generally lead to an ineﬃcient
distribution of ﬁrms.
5.2. Central Government Intervention
It is clear that in a fully decentralized regional setting, an ineﬃcient allocation of resources occurs
primarily because ﬁrms are allocated ineﬃciently between regions. In addition, the relative levels of
consumption in the two regions may diﬀer from what might be regarded as socially optimal. We now
examine how a ﬁrst-mover central government could decentralize the social optimum in a federal
setting. We examine this problem assuming that the central government’s policy instruments
include taxes on ﬁrms in each region, denoted by (T1,T 2), and an inter-regional transfer from
region 1 to region 2, denoted by B. It can select its policies before regional governments choose
theirs.
The location equilibrium condition will now be given by,
π1(N1,σ 1,V 1(N1,σ 1),s 1(N1,σ 1)) − t1 − T1 (16)
− π2( ¯ N − N1,σ 2,V 2( ¯ N − N1,σ 2),s 2( ¯ N − N1,σ 2)) + t2 + T2 =0
which determines N1(σ1,t 1,T 1,σ 2,t 2,T 2) where ∂N1/∂ti = ∂N1/∂Ti for i =1 ,2. As before, the
regional governments must select (ci,t i,σ i) to maximize regional welfare. We envision Stage 1
(Government Policies) as being decomposed into two sub-stages:
Stage 1a: Choice of (T1,T 2,B) by the central government;
Stage 1b: Choice of (c1,t 1,σ 1,c 2,t 2,σ 2) by the regional governments.
21 In Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991), the SPNE’s are ineﬃcient. These ineﬃciencies arise because
regional governments are restricted to use only capital/ﬁrm taxes rather than capital/ﬁrm and head
taxes, where we interpret capital in their models as ﬁrms in our’s.
22 If regions are identical, then the distribution of ﬁrms will be eﬃcient in the SPNE since ﬁrm taxes
will be the same. If regions have diﬀerent populations, then ﬁrm taxes will diﬀer and there will be
an ineﬃcient allocation of ﬁrms in the SPNE. In both cases, proﬁts will be diverted from the workers
given the minimum proﬁt constraint is not binding.
23 Recall, with same-sized regions, N1 = N2 in the social optimum. Therefore, if b Ni = N/2, the
distribution of ﬁrms in the SPNE with matching agglomeration will be eﬃcient. With regions that
diﬀer in size, L1/N1 <L 2/N2 in the social optimum. The number of ﬁrms owned by workers in
region 1 must be disproportionately larger than the number owned in region 2 for the SPNE to have
an eﬃcient allocation of ﬁrms.
16At Stage 1b, central taxes (T1,T2) and the inter-regional transfer B have already been set
and are taken as given by regional governments. As well, each regional government takes as given
the policy choices of the other regional government. The problem of the representative region’s
government (taken again as region 1) is as above except that the inter-regional transfer B enters
negatively into its revenue constraint and the location equilibrium is given by (16). From the
ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem, we obtain the reaction functions of region 1. These will be
independent of the inter-regional transfer B: t1 = Rt
1(t2,σ2; T1,T 2) and σ1 = Rσ
1(t2,σ 2;T1,T 2). By
a similar approach, we can solve for the reaction functions for region 2: t2 = Rt
2(t1,σ 1;T1,T 2) and
σ2 = Rσ














j (T1,T 2);T1,T 2), for i =1 ,2, i 6= j. Thus, depending on (T1,T 2), diﬀerent Nash equilibria
will arise in Stage 1b.
In Stage 1a, the central (federal) government anticipates how its policies will aﬀect the Nash
equilibrium solution for the regions’ policies. Recall that the regions will use the eﬃcient rule in
choosing employment taxes σi. The central government can then achieve a social optimum if it can
induce the regions to choose policies that result in the eﬃcient allocation of ﬁrms between regions,
and if all proﬁts are diverted appropriately to households in the two regions. The instruments
available for achieving these two objectives are the choice of taxes on ﬁrms (T1,T 2) and inter-
regional transfers B. Consider these in turn.
Denote by No
1 the number of ﬁrms located in region 1 in the social optimum. Then, the






1 (T1,T 2),t N
1 (T1,T 2),T 1,σN
2 (T1,T 2),t N
2 (T1,T 2),T 2
￿
π1(·) − tN
1 (T1,T 2) − T1 = π2(·) − tN
2 (T1,T 2) − T2
where the latter equation must be equal to zero when the households do not own the ﬁrms. If this
system of two equations has a unique solution, then the federal government will clearly be capable
of replicating the social optimum. However, uniqueness of the solution to this system of equations
itself rests on the uniqueness of the Stage 1b Nash equilibrium, and it is not possible to guarantee
it at the level of generality of our analysis.24
If the Stage 1b Nash equilibrium is unique, then once the optimal number of ﬁrms has been
implemented, and all proﬁts are either in the hand of households or taken as taxes by the two
levels of government, the federal government could simply choose its interregional redistribution
scheme B to achieve whatever relative levels of consumption c1 and c2 it desires. Changes in B
induce movements along the national UPF as in the unitary state case
Finally, it is worth noting the consequences of assuming that the regions do not have access to
both σ and t as policy instruments. Without using σ, the regions would not internalize the matching
externality on labour markets. However, this does not aﬀect the ability of the central government
to ensure that the social optimum is achieved, provided the regional governments’ game (Stage
24 Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions of each region’s problem (four equations), yields a
4×4 Jacobian matrix. If this Jacobian matrix is negative quasi-deﬁnite, then the solution to the four
ﬁrst-order conditions is the unique Nash equilibrium. See Friedman (1986) for more details on Nash
equilibrium uniqueness.
171b) yields a unique Nash equilibrium. Assuming that the central government can set diﬀerential
employment subsidy rates in the two regions, it can set them at their socially optimal values. On
the other hand, if regions do not have access to taxes on ﬁrms, it is straightforward to show that
they will choose their employment subsidies non-optimally.25 That is, they will use employment
subsidies as a device for attracting ﬁrms, setting the subsidy rate at too low a level. The social
optimum can only be achieved if the central government also has access to employment subsidies
in the two regions that it can use to ensure that the overall employment subsidy is optimal. If
employment subsidies are not available to the central government, it will not be possible to achieve
the social optimum.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are several natural extensions to the above analysis. First, in our model, all workers are
identical and participate in the labour force. In the real world, job creation is often thought of
as an instrument for inducing marginal workers to participate in the labour force, and can be
viewed as a form of redistribution. To examine this aspect of policy, there must be some worker
heterogeneity. A standard approach is to allow diﬀerent worker abilities. We would then require
a more general production function which uses diﬀerent skilled individuals as diﬀerent inputs or
allows for separate production processes. Alternatively, we could allow workers to have diﬀering
preferences. Second, the process giving rise to unemployment could be modeled diﬀerently. For
example, we could have allowed the matching technology to assign job matches randomly across
ﬁrms rather than the same number per ﬁrm. Alternatively, an eﬃciency wage argument could have
been used to explain unemployment. Third, we have adopted the extreme assumption of immobile
labour. Allowing for labour mobility would raise similar issues as those we have discussed in this
paper. Fourth, we have assumed a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms in the federation. If the number of ﬁrms
were endogenous, then the social optimum would have some optimal number of ﬁrms being created.
Obviously, when there is ﬁscal decentralization there is no reason to expect that the number of
ﬁrms in equilibrium will be optimum. Some additional central instrument will no doubt be required
to ensure a socially optimal allocation.
Finally, we have adopted the assumption of perfect information on the part of governments for
simplicity. If governments could not monitor whether individuals were looking for work, then full
unemployment insurance would not result and the full social optimum could not be decentralized
even to a unitary state. In the case, the analysis could be carried out using the benchmark of an
informationally constrained second-best social optimum, and the same sorts of qualitative results
could be derived.
25 This is analyzed in some detail in Boadway, Cuﬀ and Marceau (2002).
187. APPENDIX
7.1 Dynamic Problem of the Firm
In the basic model presented here, we abstract from agglomeration eﬀects and ignore government
policies. Incorporating them is straightforward.
The basic notation we use is as follows:
nt = number of workers at beginning of period t
vt = number of vacancies posted in period t
et = number of of workers used in production in period t
Timing during period t
￿ Firm starts period t with nt workers.
￿ Separation occurs: (1 − b)nt workers stay with the ﬁrm; bnt workers leave the ﬁrm.
￿ Firm chooses hiring strategy (vt,r t).
￿ Aggregate variables (wt,m t) are determined.
￿ Fixed cost ψ[(1 − b)nt + vt] is incurred.
￿ Matching takes place: rtmtvt vacancies are ﬁlled; (1 − rtmt)vt vacancies remain unﬁlled.
￿ Production takes place with et =( 1− b)nt + rtmtvt workers.
The transition equation is simply: nt+1 = et
The problem of the ﬁrm
We have: et =( 1−b)nt+rtmtvt. It follows that vt =[ et − (1 − b)nt]/rtmt and that the transition
equation can be written as nt+1 = et.
The problem of the ﬁrm can be written as:
V (nt)=m a x
et,rt
f(et) − rtwtet − ψ
￿
(1 − b)nt +




s.t. nt+1 = et
n0 given
The Euler equations are:
et : f0(et) − rtwt −
ψ
rtmt
+ βV 0 (nt+1)=0
rt : −wtet +
ψ
rt
[et − (1 − b)nt]
rtmt
=0
Using the Benveniste-Scheinkman formula, we can re-write the Euler equations as:
et : f0(et) − rtwt −
ψ
rtmt




rt : −wtet +
ψ
rt




Imposing r = 1 and eliminating time subscripts, we obtain:
e =( 1− b)n + mv
n = e
which in turn leads to:
be = mv (A3)








− we + ψ
[e − (1 − b)n]
m
= 0 (A20)











which is (2) in the text in the absence of agglomeration eﬀects and employment subsidies.
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218. TECHNICAL APPENDIX
8.1 The Social Optimum
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
u0(c1) − λL1 =0 (c1)
ϕu0(c2) − λL2 =0 (c2)
λ[Nia(Ni)f0(ei) − ψ(1 − b)] − δiNi − γibNi =0 i =1 ,2 (ei)
− λψ − δisi + γiρ(Nivi)ρ−1m(si)=0 i =1 ,2 (vi)
− δiNivi + γi(Nivi)ρm0(si)=0 i =1 ,2 (si)
λ
￿
a(N1)f(e1) − ψ((1 − b)e1 + v1)+N1a0(N1)f(e1) − a(N2)f(e2)+ψ((1 − b)e2 + v2) (N1)
− N2a0(N2)f(e2)
￿










Using (si), (vi), and (ei), we obtain:
a(Ni)f0(ei)=ψ
￿





Using (ei), (N1), and (vi), we get:
a(N1)(f(e1) − e1f0(e1)) + N1a0(N1)f(e1)=a(N2)(f(e2) − e2f0(e2)) + N2a0(N2)f(e2) (TA2)
Second-Order Conditions of the Social Optimum
These conditions are relevant since agglomeration eﬀects can give rise to non-convexities that
might entail corner solutions or multiple local optima. To characterize the second-order conditions
of the social optimum, it turns out to be easier to suppress c from the above problem and assume
that the objective is to maximize total product rather than utility. This gives the same solution
as above without specifying a particular point on the economy-wide UPF. The problem can be
further simpliﬁed by disaggregating the planner’s problem into two steps. In the ﬁrst, the planner
assigns ﬁrms to the two regions and in the second, each regional planner optimizes with respect to
employment and vacanciesgiven the matching technologyand the labour market-clearing condition.
The analysis proceeds in reverse order starting with the second step.
Step 2: Regional Planning Optimum
In this second step, the representative regional planner given the size of its population L takes the
number of ﬁrms in its region N as given and solves the following problem:
max
{e,v}
N[a(N)f(e) − ψ((1 − b)e + v)] subject to (Nv)ρm(s(e,v,N)) − bNe =0 ( γ)
where s(e,v,N,L)=( L − Ne)/Nv.
22The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions are:
N[a(N)f0(e)− ψ(1 − b)] + γ [(Nv)ρm0(s)se − bN]=0 ( e)
− Nψ+ γ[ρ(Nv)ρ−1Nm(s)+( Nv)ρm0(s)sv]=0 ( v)
Deﬁne z = G(e,v)=N[a(N)f(e)− ψ((1 − b)e+ v)] and g(e,v)=bNe − (Nv)ρm(s(e,v,N)). The
second-order suﬃcient condition for a relative maximum of z is that d2z is negative deﬁnite subject
to dg = 0 which holds if and only if the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix evaluated
at the solution to the necessary conditions is positive. This determinant is given by the following
expression:
|H| = −ge[ge(Gvv − γgvv) − gv(Gev − γgev)] + gv[ge(Gve − γgve) − gv(Gee − γgee)]
Diﬀerentiating g and F:
ge = N[(Nv)ρ−1m0(s)+b] > 0
gv = −(Nv)ρm(s)
v
(ρ − η) < 0
gee = −(Nv)ρm00(s) > 0
gvv = −(Nv)ρm(s)
v2 (ρ − η)(ρ − η − 1) > 0
gev = gve =( Nv)ρm(s)
v2 (ρ − η) > 0
Gee = Na(N)f00(e) < 0
Gvv = Gve = Gev =0
|H| can then be rewritten as |H| = g2
eγgvv − 2gegvγgev − g2
vGee + g2
vγgee > 0. Therefore, the
second-order suﬃcient conditions are satisﬁed for a relative maximum.
Next, substituting the expression for γ into (e) and re-organizing terms, we obtain (TA1). Con-
dition (TA1) together with the matching constraint (γ) determines e(N,L) and v(N,L). Totally
diﬀerentiating these two expressions and using Cramer’s Rule and the expressions for se, sv, sN,
























Ce = −N(m0(s)(Nv)ρ−1 + b) < 0
Cv =( Nv)ρm(s)
v
(ρ − η) > 0
CN = be
￿







CL = −(Nv)ρ−1m0(s) < 0












































23The determinant is negative, CeFv − CvFe < 0. However, as the sign of FN is ambiguous so
too is the sign of de/dN. If there is no production agglomeration, then a0 = 0 and FN < 0 in which
case de/dN < 0. However, if there is production agglomeration e may be increasing or decreasing
in N. Regardless of the type of agglomeration, per ﬁrm employment is increasing in L, de/dL > 0.
Applying the Envelope Theorem to the maximum value function of the regional planning problem,
W(N), and combining with (TA1), we get:
dW
dN
= a(N)f(e)+Na0(N)f(e)− ea(N)f0(e) (TA5)
Step 1: Central Planning Optimum











Using (TA5), this may be written as (TA2).




Using (TA2), the left-hand side of this condition can be written as:




+ N2a00(N2)f(e2)+a0(N2)[2f(e2) − e2f0(e2) ]+[ N2a0(N2)f0(e2) − e2a(N2)f00(e2)]
de2
dN2
The sign of (TA7) is generally ambiguous.
Characterizing the Social Optimum
Case 1: No Agglomeration
Suppose there are no production agglomeration eﬀects: a0 = 0. Then, as shown above, de/dN < 0.








which is satisﬁed everywhere. Therefore, the solution which satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions,
(TA1) and (TA2), and the regional matching constraints, (γi) for i =1 ,2, is the unique global
optimum.
In this case, the ﬁrst-order necessary condition reduces to:
f(e1) − e1f0(e1)=f(e2) − e2f0(e2) (TA20)
24Recall, that e is determined at Step 2 and depends on both N and L. Since f(e)−ef0(e) is strictly
increasing in e, (TA20) implies that N1 is set such that:
e(N1,L 1)=e(N − N1,L 2)
Now, suppose L1 = L2. Then this condition can only be satisﬁed if N1 = N/2. As the second-order
conditions are satisﬁed, this symmetric optimum (same e, v, and s) is unique and holds regardless
of whether or not there are matching agglomeration eﬀects. Note, however, that with matching
agglomeration eﬀects, ρ>1, the value of e at the social optimum will diﬀer from that in the case
of no matching agglomeration.
Next, suppose that L1 >L 2. Then, at N1 = N2, e1 >e 2 since de/dL > 0. In order, to equalize
the e’s more ﬁrms must be located in Region 1 since de/dN < 0. Therefore, N1 > N/2. In this
case, when ρ = 1 the symmetric outcome in terms of e, v and s is still the social optimum, but it
no longer is if ρ>1. To see this, ﬁrst suppose that ρ = 1. Then, the ﬁrst-order conditions from








i =1 ,2 (TA10)
vim(si) − be =0 i =1 ,2( γi)
Note that neither of these conditions depend on Ni explicitly. Given e1 = e2 = e, it follows
from (TA10) that s1 = s2 which then implies from (γi) that v1 = v2. From the deﬁnition of
si =( Li/Ni − ei)/vi and the fact that s1 = s2 and v1 = v2, it must be that L1/N1 = L2/N2.
Case 2: Matching Agglomeration
Suppose ρ>1, then the ﬁrst-order conditions from Step 2 and the regional matching constraints
for both regions can be written as follows, using the fact that m0(s)/m(s)=η/s:
f0(e)=ψ
￿







i =1 ,2 (TA100)
(Nivi)ρm(si) − bNie =0 i =1 ,2( γi)
Suppose s1 = s2 and v1 = v2 which implies from the deﬁnition of s that L1/N1 = L2/N2. This
assumption violates the matching constraints since they can only both be satisﬁed if N1 = N2
which contradicts the fact that N1 >N 2. Therefore, it cannot be that s1 = s2 and v1 = v2 which
implies that L1/N2 6= L2/N2 in the social optimum with matching agglomeration and regions that
diﬀer in size.
Substituting out si and using the matching constraint (TA100), we obtain:
f0(e)=ψ
￿
1 − b +
ηvi





i =1 ,2 (TA1000)
The right-hand side of the above condition is increasing in vi and decreasing in Li/Ni. Therefore,
since e1 = e2 = e it must be that v1 > (<)v2 and L1/N1 > (<)L2/N2 (equality of these variables
25violates the matching constraint). Then, substituting out si using its deﬁnition and dividing by
Nρ, the matching constraint becomes:
v
ρ
i m((Li/Ni − e)/vi) − bN
1−ρ
i e =0 i =1 ,2( γi)
The left-hand side is increasing in both vi and Li/Ni. Given N1 >N 2, it follows from the matching
constraint together with (TA1000) that v1 <v 2 and L1/N1 <L 2/N2. More ﬁrms are located in
the larger region relative to the case when there are no matching agglomeration. If instead we
substituted vi out of the conditions, then it would be the case that both the right-hand side of
(TA1000) and the matching constraint are increasing in s and L/N and therefore, s1 < (>)s2 and
L1/N1 > (<)L2/N2. The fact that N1 >N 2 does not seem to eliminate one of these possibilities.
However, we know that s1 6= s2 since if it did then L/N would be the same from (TA1000) which
violates the matching constraint. Therefore, given L1/N1 <L 2/N2 it must be that s1 >s 2.
Case 3: Production Agglomeration
Suppose a0 > 0. Then, as shown above de/dN may be increasing or decreasing in N. In this
case, the second-order condition of the social optimum is given by (TA7). Here, whether the above
condition is satisﬁed or not will depend on the form of a(N) and whether de/dN is positive or
negative. Unlike the case with no production agglomeration, the sign of de/dN depends on the
point it is evaluated at. Therefore, there may be multiple local optima for the social planner’s
problem when there is production agglomeration.
8.2 Federal State













Next, substituting out for µ in (N) and solving for t, we have









+( N − b N)
dπ2
dN
Noting that de/dN = eN +2eσdw/dN, dπ/dN = a0(N)f(e)−(2e)dw/dN,( w+σ)=ψ(V ρm0(s)+
bV (1 − ρ + η)/[V ρm(s)(ρ − η)], and substituting in for dw/dN, we can rewrite the above as:






V ρm(s)(ρ − η)
￿













where X = V ρm0(s)+Vb (1 − ρ + η).
Using the matching constraint bNe = V ρm(s) and the deﬁnition of ∆, it can be shown that
the right-hand side of the above is zero. Therefore:
t =( N − b N)
dπ2
dN
− Na0(N)f(e)
26